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APPROACH TO THE DEF INITION ON TERRORISM
• Terrorism in the EU Directive on terrorism (2017)
• To commit one within a group of offences (attacks, murders, kidnappings, 
extensive destruction, seizure of aircraft, threatens…) committed with the aim 
of:
– Seriously intimidating a population.
– Unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to 
perform or abstain from performing any act.
– Seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional 
economic or social structures of a country or an international 
organisation.
• The US State Department in its annual document, called, “Patterns of Global 
terrorism”, defines terrorism as 
– “politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets 
by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 
an audience”.
D I F F I C U LT I E S  T O  TA R G E T  T E R R O R I S M
• Political biases increase difficulties in defining the term because of its subjective nature. 
• Reasons:
• 1st Relativism: Many times, “one man's terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. 
• 2nd problem is related to the contents of the definition (e. g. What are non-combatants,…).
• 3rd all the definitions portray non-state actors as terrorists, while completely ignore terrorism 
perpetrated by the state. 
• Difficult difference between revolutionary violence and  
terrorism
• The activities of freedom fighters cannot always be termed as ‘terrorism’, 
because their target is the repressive government (Martha Crenshaw).
• The distinction between ‘freedom fighting’ and ‘terrorism’ must be made on 
the grounds of the legitimacy of the movement for independence, recognized 
by the UN Article 1(2) of the UN Charter recognizes the right of self-
determination of the peoples. 
– E.g. The liberation movements are deprecated as terrorists by the 
governments against which the struggles for independence are conducted. 
Terrorism is a ‘process of terror’ having three elements: 
the act or threat of 
violence, 
the emotional reaction 
to extreme fear on the 
part of the victims or 
potential victims, 
and the social effects 
that follow the violence 
(or its threat) and the 
consequent fear. 
1.2. T H E  S O- C A L L E D IN T E R N AT ION AL  T E R R OR IS M ,  N E W T E R R OR IS M ,   GL OBA L  
T E R R OR IS M ,  IS L A M IC  T E R R OR IS M , …  J IH A D IS M/T HE  J IH A D IST  T E R R OR IS M
• The global Jihadist terrorism has its base in radical Islamism and its 
maximum expression in Al Qaeda, the terrorist group Islamic State and the 
dense network of groups and cells that emerged around them after 9/11, Boko 
Haram,…
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NEW TERRORISM (JIHADISM) AS A GLOBAL 
PHENOMENON 
• New terrorism with new features:
– dispersed structure, 
– with a high degree of fanaticism which facilitates immolations with high power to 
cause damage, 
– telematic networks for financing and recruitment of followers, to indoctrinate, 
propaganda, campaign in social networks,
– its persecution is difficult,
– it seems to be an enemy that cannot be seen and that can appear as an isolated 
cell in the corner of any city... 
– it is a diffuse danger. 
• “…history of the rise of IS, perforce, constitutes an account of the many 
US failures to develop a consistent policy focus in the Middle East after 
the withdrawal of forces from Iraq at the end of 2011…”
• Salafism:  based on Sayyid Qutb’s theories (joined Muslim Brotherhood). 
The Global Jihad.
• Al-Qaeda was born in1988 in Afghanistan (88% Sunnis) against Soviet 
invasion, aided by the US.  Leader: Osama Bin Laden.
• 1996-2001. Taliban movements controlled South of Afghanistan.
• The rise and development of the IS go from its origins in Iraq after the US 
invasion in 2003 up to late 2014. Then, proclamation of the Caliphate IS
by its leader Abu Bakr Al Bagdadi in the summer of 2015 (Murdered in 
July 2017). Social networks propaganda.
– Mobilization among individuals from particularly vulnerable social 
segments within Western European societies.
• At home
• Many young people travel to Syria and Iraq to fight in the ranks 
of ISIS
• foreign terrorist fighters
• The phenomenon of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters
– They are nationals traveling or attempting to travel to a State other than their State of 
residence or nationality, and others who travel or attempt to travel from their territories 
to a State other than their State of residence or nationality, with the purpose of 
committing, planning or preparing terrorist acts or participate in them, or providing or 
receiving training for terrorist purposes.


• UN Security Council Resolutions 2170(2014) and 2178(2014) on Foreign 
Terrorist Fighters:
– Urged the states to cooperate to prevent terrorists from recruiting and 
fight against violent extremist propaganda and incitement on the Internet.
– Stressed the importance of cooperation with civil society and the private 
sector.
– Invited a greater exchange of information with the purpose of identifying 
those fighters.
• Appeal to the Member States to use the INTERPOL databases and demand 
that the airlines of their jurisdiction provide advance information on 
passengers.
• CoE  adopted an additional protocol to the Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism to address the phenomenon of foreign 
terrorist fighters, 2015 (open to signatures).
• Despite continuing, serious setbacks on battlefields in Syria and Iraq 
in 2016-17, the Islamic State (IS) remains a force to be reckoned 
with not only in the regions bordering these two countries, but also 
further afield, in Africa, Europe and the United States.
1.3. A SENSE OF 
INSECURITY/VULNERABILITY
– Many governments adopted measures that, although designed to 
safeguard such interest, were not innocuous. 
– Such measures simply resulted in the erosion and in some cases 
the infringement of fundamental rights.
1.4. RESPONSES: OVERREACTION?
UN SECURITY COUNCIL
Resolution No. 1368 
(2001), the Security 
Council of the United 
Nations
• Terrorism is a threat to 
international peace and 
security
Resolution No. 1373 (2001)
• Urged all States to take 
measures to prevent the 
commission of terrorist 
acts 
Resolution  No. 1535
• Counter-T Committee 
Executive Directorate, 
2004
• In 2006 the United Nations (UN) put forward a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 
One of its major purposes was to stop terrorism at its roots by acting for prevention. 
The UN strategy listed a number of conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, namely: 
- Prolonged unresolved conflicts 
- Discrimination and intolerance 
- Xenophobia 
- Poverty and economic inequalities 
- Social exclusion and high youth unemployment 
- Political exclusion 
- Human rights deficits and lack of good governance
DOMESTIC L AW  I
USA: Patriot Act 2001 (Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism ); Detainee Treatment Act
GB: in 2001, the British Parliament enacted the Counter-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
CANADA: 2001 Antiterrorist Act
ITALIA: Criminal Law was amended to introduce new 
terrorist crimes 2001





of liberty and 
detentions, 
tortures, Black sites











DOMESTIC L AW  II
FRANCE: 2005 Counter-terrorist Act
UK Prevention on terrorism Act  and Terrorist Act 2006
Amendments on Germany and Canadian Terrorist Laws 2006
France since 2015: Declaration of state of emergency until 2017 
when a new counter-terrorist law was adopted 
Amendments in many European domestic Criminal Laws
F R E N C H  N E W  L A W  T O  S T R E N G T H E N  I N T E R N A L  S E C U R I T Y  A N D  T H E  F I G H T  A G A I N S T  
T E R R O R I S M  O C T 2 0 1 7
• Security Zones. The power to designate public areas and sporting or cultural events, including music 
concerts, that are deemed to be at risk of terrorism, as security zones. to search all persons or 
vehicles. 
• Closing Places of Worship.
• House Arrest. Any individual for whom there are “serious reasons to believe that his or her conduct 
constitutes a particularly serious threat to public security and public order” may be placed under 
house arrest — without the prior approval of a judge — for a period of three months, renewable. 
• Search and Seizure. To ask a judge for a warrant to search the home of anyone suspected of posing 
a threat to public security. 
• Radicalized Public Servants.
• Electronic Surveillance and Data Collection. To collect the telephone and email communications 
of suspicious individuals “for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offenses and serious crimes”.  Also travel data.
• Border Checks. Police to conduct warrantless identity checks at more than 118 border areas and 
373 airports, seaports and train stations, as well as the surrounding areas up to a radius of 20 
kilometres. 
SPAIN
• Not a change in the law after 2004 attacks.
• Art. 55.2 SC
• 2015 amendment to the Criminal Code including new crimes and more penalties:
– The Organic Act 2/2015 now penalises those who are trained or receive indoctrination regarding the carrying out of terrorist offenses (Article 
575), as well as individuals who regularly access communication services available to the public through the Internet that are designed to 
encourage the incorporation of a terrorist organisation or collaborate with it, and, equally, any individual who moves to a Jihadist territory to 
collaborate with the terrorist movement.
• Law 4/2015, on the protection of citizen security. 
• Law 13/2015, of October 5, on modification of the Criminal Prosecution Law to strengthen procedural measures and the regulation of the 
technological research measures. 
• Law 36/2015,  on National Security.
Security
Liberty
• DISPROPORTIONAL RESPONSES ?????
– In general, are those risks always clear? Are possible future risks 
overestimated? 
– Are the actions that governments carry out to prevent the risk of 
terrorism justified in every case? 
– When are governments entitled to take such measures involving the 
limitations of my rights?
– What about proportionality?
• PROPORTIONALITY:
– State’s intervention only is possible when adequate, necessary 
and suitable to  protect against the risks/dangers.
– But this principle was held when concrete dangers existed, not 
to f.ace hypothetical/abstract risks
• History teaches that after the security crisis has passed, it 
generally becomes evident that there was not a rational 
factual basis for sacrificing rights in favor of security needs.
THE RULE OF  L AW  AND HUMAN RIGHTS MUST BE RESPECTED F OR  
EV ERYBODY W HEN F ACING TERRORISM









2. FIGHTING TERRORISM FROM A HUMAN 
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE. SECURITY VS. 
HUMAN RIGHTS
2.1. HOW TO ASSESS THE THREAT OF 
TERRORISM?
• Global risk and the fear of those risks (such as terrorism) is an undeniable 
phenomenon currently occurring on a global scale and, one that involves 
fundamental rights, which calls for a supranational response. 
• State should provide a timely and appropriate response to terrorism and other 
global risks. 
• Security means protecting people’s freedom in such a way that everyone can 
enjoy life without being threatened, BUT also without the fear of being 
continuously under surveillance or constrained in their liberties.
Rawls’ reflections on the “rule of clear and present danger” theory 
• We must consider whether a greater interest exists (a clear risk) 
that justifies the limitation of certain individual rights. The intensity 
of the risk, the consequences in the event that the perceived 
danger occurs, and the probability of this happening need to be 
evaluated. 
• Time should be taken to consider alternative, less invasive 
solutions, or to calculate the consequences for particular 
individuals, groups or the society at large.
T H E  “ T S H W A N E  P R I N C I P L E S ”  ( 2 0 1 3 )
• Persuasive principles were drafted by 17 
organisations and five academic centres 
throughout Africa, the Americas, Europe 
and Asia based on conversations and 
information provided by more than 500 
experts from more than 70 countries, 
including government and former 
government officials and military officers, 
at meetings around the world over a two-
year period. 
• Guidelines for those 
engaged in drafting, revising 
or implementing laws or 
provisions relating to the 
State’s authority to 
withhold information on 
the grounds of national 
security 








Human rights standards as a limitation to governmental security actions
A) Some steps taken within the United Nations
• In the framework of the United Nations, the Security Council has gradually 
accepted the connection between upholding human rights and preserving 
international peace and security, expressly referred to human rights in the 
context of counter-terrorism.
• A new approach to human rights was later adopted, when the Security 
Council, under Resolutions No. 1456 (2003) and No. 1624 (2005) and 
subsequent resolutions, stressed that States needed to ensure that any 
measure taken to combat terrorism “complies with all of their obligations 
under international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee 
law, and humanitarian law”.
• Despite this, there still remain strong currents of opinion which hold that the 
human rights perspective is not duly anchored in the UN Security Council’s 
agenda.
2006
UN  GLOBAL COUNTER -TER R OR ISM STR ATEGY
(R EVIEWED EVER Y 2  YEAR S)
• The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has also dealt with several cases reflecting the 
need to strike a balance between fundamental rights and the counter-terrorism fight. For 
instance, on Marc 31, 2009, the UNHRC adopted its decision on the case of AK and AR v. 
Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/95/D/1233/2003). Terrorist bombings took place in Tashkent, the capital 
of Uzbekistan in 1999 and the Government accused the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan of 
being behind these actions. In the investigation, AK and AR were arrested after the authorities 
discovered several publications and other written material on religious matters. The detainees 
were convicted for offences related to the dissemination of the ideology of the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan. The Committee found that the Uzbek authorities based their actions 
on a perceived threat to national security, thereby not violating any of the stipulations of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR). 
• The Committee has also examined cases related to the placement of individuals on a 
suspected terrorist list (The case of Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006). 
Here, the Committee found that Belgium acted prematurely, and therefore wrongfully, in 
transmitting the authors’ names to the Sanctions Committee before the conclusion of the 
criminal investigation into the authors’ activities initiated by the State’s Public Prosecutor, with 
adverse consequences for their freedom of movement, their honour and reputation, and which 
led to interference in their private life.
B ) T H E  E U RO P E A N C O U RT  O F H U MA N RI G H T S :  A  L O NG E R W A L K
• It is in Europe perhaps where the steps taken towards protecting rights in the courter-
terrorism fight have been more visible.
• In the context of the Council of Europe, 
– The General Assembly adopted the Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism 
(2002)
• The guidelines seek to reconcile legitimate national security concerns with the protection of fundamental 
freedoms within the context of the European system.
– European Convention on the prevention of terrorism (2005).
– An additional protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism to address the 
phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, as well as an action plan on the fight against violent 
extremism and radicalisation leading to terrorism. The Protocol was opened for signature on 
October 22, 2015 in Riga.
– The Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER) follows the implementation of the Council 
of Europe legal instruments against terrorism and coordinates the Council of Europe activities in 
combating terrorism.
• Very important role of the ECHR.
• Case El-Masri v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia case on secret “rendition” operations 
• It recently held that keeping a convicted terrorist in solitary confinement during the first ten years of life 
imprisonment under poor conditions constituted inhuman or degrading treatment.
– Abdullah Öcalan v Turkey, March 18, 2014.
• On procedural rights during the detention and trial of alleged terrorists, the ECHR found inadmissible infinite 
or overdue detentions.  
– A. and others v. the United Kingdom, February 19, 2009 (Grand Chamber).
• The European Judges also ruled against the prohibition of deportation or extradition whenever there is an 
actual risk of ill-treatment in another State.  
– Chahal v. the United Kingdom, November 15, 1996; Saadi v. Italy, February 28, 2008 (Grand Chamber); Ben Khemais v. Italy, 
February 24, 2009; Labsi v. Slovakia, May 15, 2012.
• Recognised the right to be tried within a reasonable time. 
– Berasategi v. France, Esparza Luri v. France, Guimon Ep. Esparza v. France, Sagarzazu v. France and Soria Valderrama v. France,  
January 26, 2012.
• Court has ruled on the measures taken by States in the fight against terrorism, confirming that they must 
respect human rights and the rule of law, and exclude arbitrariness and discriminatory or racist treatment. 
– McCann and others v. the United Kingdom, September 27, 1995; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, January 12, 2010; 
Nada v. Switzerland, September 12, 2012 (Grand Chamber).
C) THE EUR OP EAN UNION’S CHALLENGES TO TER R ORISM
• EU counter-terrorism policies have always attempted not to overlook 
fundamental rights, at least in the texts.
– Council Framework Decision, of June 13, 2002, on combating terrorism 
established that: “Nothing in this Framework Decision may be interpreted 
as being intended to reduce or restrict fundamental rights or freedoms 
such as the right to strike, freedom of assembly, of association or of 
expression, including the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions 
with others for the protection of his or her interests and the related right 
to demonstrate” (Recital No. 10).
• Council Framework Decision, of 13 June 2002, on combating terrorism
• EU counter-terrorism strategy (2005)
• EU Internal Security Strategy (2010)
• Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in the Council
• Agreement with other countries to share information, even classified information
• EU Directive on combating terrorism (2017)
• Kadi case 
• The ECJ essentially had to decide whether a UN Security Council Resolution should take 
precedence over EU law. This was not found on the grounds that the enforcement of that UN 
Resolution would constitute a clear and obvious violation of human rights.
• Kadi was identified as a possible supporter of Al-Qaida by the UN Security Council and was 
sanctioned. The EU transposed this UN sanction by means of a regulation that Kadi then 
challenged before the EU Courts. Kadi had not been informed of the grounds for his inclusion 
in the list of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions stated. The ECJ reviewed the 
lawfulness of the EU regulation transposing the UN resolution, arguing that the protection of 
fundamental rights forms part of the very foundations of the EU’s legal order.
• The ECJ has ruled on several occasions regarding the inclusion of individuals on lists of 
terrorists (terrorist blacklists). It found that “it is made clear that the names of persons, groups 
or entities can be kept on the list only if the Council reviews their situation periodically. All 
such matters must be open to judicial review”.
– Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof v. E and F, June 29, 2010, C-550/09; Bundesrepublik
Deutschland v. B and D, November 9, 2010, C-57/09 and C-101/09; France v. People’s Mojahedin
Organization of Iran, December, 21 C-27/09 P.
• Also ruled on cases concerning secret evidence. 
– Case C-27/09 P French Republic v. OMPI, 2011.
• It also ruled on suspected terrorist activists, whereby it found that an individual must, in any 
event, be informed of the essence of the grounds leading to a decision. 
– Case of ZZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2013. Case C-300/11.
Our main future discussions will revolve around 
the question of how we assess the risks and what 
behaviors we recommend as a consequence. 
I N T H E  S T RUG G L E  OF T E RRORI S M  D O NOT  FORG E T
• 1. Fundamental rights are an essential part of a democratic legal system and 
occupy a privileged position within it.
• The ECHR warned about the problem of overreacting to terrorism: “it is fully aware of the 
undeniable difficulties of combating terrorism ⎯in particular with regard to obtaining and 
producing evidence⎯ and of the ravages caused to society by this problem, but considers that 
such factors cannot justify restricting to this extent the rights of the defence of any person 
charged with a criminal offence”, Case Hulki Gunes v. Turkey, June 19, 2003, para. 90. See also 
case Klass v. Germany, September 6, 1978.
• ECHR “an interference” (on rights) will be considered “necessary in a democratic society”.
2. Even in exceptional circumstances, there is a minimum level of respect for 
fundamental rights that cannot be transgressed. 
• The declaration of emergency requires the concurrence of certain circumstances.
• The law offers authorities the possibility to restrict the scope of rights or their exercise on 
account of national security interests. 
• Remember: the state of emergency should be exceptional.
• It is necessary to highlight the fundamental limits to State power in times of an emergency. This 
is the only way to ensure an effective and efficient protection of human rights and avoid abuses. 
– In France the state of emergency was intended to be a temporary measure but has since been 
extended 6 times. In October 2017 France passed the Anti-Terrorist Act. It enshrined some state of 
emergency measures into law.
3. The rule of law constitutes another core lesson drawn from constitutionalism, 
which is of significance to fundamental rights. 
• Any action concerning rights must be executed under the law. 
• Any counter-terrorism action impacting on civil rights has to be adopted in accordance with 
the law. 
• The effectiveness of the rule of law is linked to the principle of accountability of public 
authorities (both judicial and political).
4. Fourthly, civil rights impose obligations on the State, which are both negative and 
positive. 
• The constitutional right to security entitles people to be protected by the State, since citizens 
are unable to provide this for themselves. Against the threat of terrorism, people may expect 
policies to be adopted which act to make them feel more secure. 
• Security should not be attained at the expense of unjustified restraints on other freedoms.
5. Human rights reach beyond State borders and their protection constitutes a 
supranational issue.
• In the case of the terrorism risk, since this has become a global issue, a global response is 
required in the form of a supranational strategy of human rights promotion. 
• Therefore, it is essential to keep the human rights dimension firmly within the fight against 
terrorism and other global risks. 
SOME IDEAS TO TACKLE TERRORISM
1.  Make a good and rational evaluation of the risks or menaces.
2.  Anticipate to the exceptional risks, not lightly ruling the responses. Good laws are 
made while cool-headed.
3.  Adopt measures step by step.
4.  Adopt exceptional measures temporarily and review them.
5. Judicial control.
6. Establish a good system of grounds for justification 
(that could justify rights’ limitations).
It is important not to appeal to the 




FREEDOMS OF THE PRESUMED
TERRORISTS 
• AFTER PATRIOT ACT and particularly during the period between 2002 and 2005
• CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) was accused of: 
– Arbitrary arrests
– Extraordinary renditions.  CIA secretly held its prisoners in the so called ‘black sites‘. 
– many detainees, when presumed to be terrorists, have been subjected to treatment that can be 
qualified as torture, while others continue to be deprived of liberty even after many years
– abuses of suspected terrorist prisoners occurred at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, Bagram and at 
other such camps. 
• The White House announced the finish of that programme in 2005. 
• targeted killings have been ordered 
• Blacklisting suspected terrorists exist
• A similar flood of accusations was made against the British secret service (MI6), for showing 
complicity with the CIA in the torture of suspected terrorists abroad.
AR BITR AR Y DETENTIONS AND TOR TUR ES
• Arbitrary arrests started from the very first moment after the 9/11.   Arrests were practiced by 
the CIA or British Intelligence Services in many cases.  Those detentions were practised with 
arbitrariness, tortures…
• That continues to happen in other countries (with a lower level of arbitrariness and tortures)
• Even today, particularly after terrorist attacks in France in 2015, dozens of French Muslims filed 
cases for wrongful detention and excessive use of force, arguing that police raids at their homes 
or workplaces had destroyed their reputations and livelihoods, prompting critical reports from 
Amnesty and Human Rights Watch.
Secret detentions
• Secret and highly secure detention facilities, so-called “black sites”, were established in at least 
seven different overseas locations, to which the CIA delivered its detainees for “enhanced 
interrogation”. 
• Detention in CIA custody meant being indefinitely kept in secret, incommunicado, solitary 
confinement.
Extraordinary renditions
• The practice of “renditions”, i.e. the informal transfer of a person from the jurisdiction 
of one State to that of another on the basis of negotiations between administrative 
authorities of the two countries (often the intelligence services). 
• European government authorities (at least 25) were deeply complicit in the counter-
terrorism strategies pursued by the CIA.  They permitted, protected and participated in 
CIA operations which violated fundamental tenets of our system of justice and human 
rights protection. Therefore, European governments caused further suffering and 
violated human rights law. 
• WITH NO RESPONSIBILITY:  In many cases, an abuse of the state secrets privilege has 
hampered judiciary and parliamentary initiatives to determine responsibility. Though 
secrecy is sometimes necessary to protect the state, it should never serve as an excuse 
to conceal serious human rights violations. 
Torture/ill-treatments
• The prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is one of the most fundamental values of a 
democratic society. 
• The absolute prohibition of torture not only obliges state officials to abstain from torture or any degrading or 
inhuman treatment but also implies the obligation to provide individuals with adequate protection against such 
serious human rights violations, to carry out effective investigations and impose dissuasive sanctions on very 
person responsible.
• Moreover, such unlawful methods:
– Did not provide security agencies with reliable information. 
– Rather, incidents from Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib have strengthened the position of the extremists, including in 
Europe. 




and at other such 
camps
• Case El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia case on secret “rendition” 
operations. 
• This concerned the torture of an individual wrongly suspected of being involved in terrorist activities who 
was transferred from Macedonia to the US intelligence services. The US intelligence agents transported 
Mr. El-Marsi to a black site in Afghanistan for the purpose of interrogation until they concluded that 
he was not involved in any terrorist activity and was returned to Albania. However, this did not 
occur until after several days of being repeatedly subjected to “enhanced” interrogations, severely 
beaten, stripped and sodomised. The ECHR found that by seizing, detaining and secretly transferring 
Mr. El-Masri to the custody of US intelligence agents, Macedonia violated the prohibition of torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment, the prohibition of arbitrary detention, the right to a private 
life and a family life and the right of access to Court as stipulated under the European Convention 
on Human Rights.
• UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was established by the Commission on Human 
Rights
– LEGAL OPINION REGARDING THE DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY OF PERSONS DETAINED AT 
GUANTANAMO BAY (December 16, 2002)
– So long as a “competent tribunal” has not declared whether the status of prisoner of war may be 
considered applicable or not, the persons detained in Guantanamo Bay provisionally enjoy the guarantees 
stipulated in articles 105 and 106 of the third Geneva Convention. 
– Requested the United States to take urgent measures to have the legal status of the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay determined by a competent tribunal. 
• UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
– Report on LEGAL OPINION ON PREVENTING ARBITRARY DETENTION IN THE 
CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF DETAINEES, PARTICULARLY IN 
COUNTERING TERRORISM. January 9, 2007. 
– Studied other cases of detentions by US forces and arbitrary renditions. Prisoners moved to 
Guantanamo Bay or Baghram Air Base (outside Kabul) 2005.
– Syrian men living in the UK, Turkey or the US were deported to the Syrian Arab Republic, where 
they were immediately arrested at the airport, detained at secret locations or otherwise 
incommunicado. 2006.
– Permanent detainees in Guatanamo.
• In September 2009, the Pentagon made public a new policy guidance for detentions in 
Afghanistan. The new guidance replaces the Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board 
(UECRB) procedures with new Detainee Review Board (DRB).
• BUT,  ANYWAY…
• AND TRUMP???
TAR GETED KILLINGS
• The Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency 
have employed that controversial practice more 
frequently in recent years, both as part of combat 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and in counter-
terrorism efforts in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. 
Since then, there has been an increase in the number 
of targeted killings. 
• The successful killing of Osama bin Laden in a US 
Navy SEAL raid in May 2011 and the September 
2011 drone strike on Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-
born Yemeni cleric and al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula propagandist, are prime examples of this 
trend. 
• Permitted in the US by the law passed by the 
Congress after 9/11 (right to self-defence). 
Targeted killings are 
premeditated acts of lethal force 
employed by states in times of 
peace or during armed conflict 
to eliminate specific individuals 
outside their custody.
THE DRONES
• Have ballooned under the Obama administration.
• The issue of collateral civilian deaths: 
– Some official Pakistani sources claim that seven hundred 
innocents were killed in 2009 alone, while the US 
government sources claim that fewer than thirty civilians 
were killed from May 2008 to May 2010.
UNDUE P R OCESS OF L AW
• States have an obligation in international law to protect the public from acts of terrorism and 
to bring to justice persons who commit, or prepare or assist the commission of acts of 
terrorism. 
• Some States have:
– Extended the maximum limit of pre-charge detention, limited the possibility of a review of the 
legality of detention, impact on the presumption of innocence, used evidence such as confessions 
obtained through physical or undue psychological pressure...
– Established special or specialised chambers within the ordinary courts or special courts to deal with 
terrorism-related cases. 
• UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force , “Basic Human Rights 
Reference Guide: Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process in the Context of 
Countering Terrorism” October 2014 
– All individuals must have effective access to justice 
– by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law,
– the right to a public hearing, 
– the right to be presumed innocent, 
– right no to be compelled to testify against herself or himself, or to confess guilt, 
– right to a fair hearing, 
– right to be tried in his or her presence, 
– legal counsel, 
– restrictions on the disclosure of information for the defence may be justified in certain cases and 
subject to conditions, 
– the right to a genuine review of the conviction and/or sentence by a higher tribunal. 
THE BL ACK LISTS
• Terrorist blacklisting has been a central plank of the “war on terror” pursued by western states since 
9/11. 
• UN Resolution 1267 (and the resolutions that amended it) created the UN sanctions committee, 
comprised of all members of the security council, to compile a list of individuals and groups 
“associated with” Osama bin Laden, al-Qaida and the Taliban and compel states to bring proceedings 
or penalise those designated.
• The formal basis for such procedures lies in a Security Council resolution in 2000 which established 
a list of individuals suspected of having connections with al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and the Talibans
and compel states to bring proceedings or penalise those designated.
• Terrorist groups blacklisting.
• Individual blacklisting.
Non-Council Member States
More than 60 United Nations
Member States have never been
Members of the Security Council.
A State which is a Member of the
United Nations but not of the
Security Council may participate, 
without a vote, in its discussions
when the Council considers that
country's interests are affected. 
Both Members and non-
members of the United Nations, 
if they are parties to a dispute 
being considered by the Council, 
may be invited to take part, 
without a vote, in the Council's
discussions; the Council sets the
conditions for participation by a 
non-member State.
UN Security Council Current Members
Permanent and Non-Permanent Members
The Council is composed of 15 Members:
•five permanent members: China, France, Russian 
Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
•and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms
by the General Assembly (with end of term date):
• Bolivia (2018)
• Côte d’Ivoire (2019)








T H E  U S E  O F  P R O F I L E  A N D  B L A C K  L I S T S  O F  A L L E G E D  T E R R O R I S T S
• The formal basis for such procedures lies in a Security Council resolution in 2000 which established a list of 
individuals suspected of having connections with al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. 
• Consequences of blacklisting or profiling:
– These sanctions include the freezing of financial assets, control of any economic transaction,…
– Scrutiny of movements, not allowing entry nor asylum due to links with terrorism.
– Reinforcement of screenings in frontiers of individuals with certain profiles.
• Guaranties needed:
– E.g. the case Kadi, respect with the fundamental rights.
– ECJ : “The names of persons, groups or entities can be kept on the list only if the Council periodically reviews their situation.
All these matters must be open to judicial review”.
• Risks:
– Stigmatisation of collectives
– Discriminatory treatment





4.1.  NEED FOR  INFOR MATION/SECR ECY
• State and Intelligence services need information to preserve the State from risk:
– Prevention
– Secrecy 
• Need for information to struggle against terrorism:
– From open sources (websites, open spaces, open chats on the Internet, the street,…).
– From close sources (mail, closed webpages, homes, non public databases, social networks, financial 
transactions,…).  Problems with privacy.
The net
– Crucial and useful for terrorists to commit crimes, earn and share black money, laundry of 
money, raise funds for attacks, seek supporters, defend their causes, coordinate groups, and 
mount terrorist attacks…
– Since terrorists make use of the digital era’s tools, governmental monitoring and supervision 
of digital communications and data can be justified.
– EU governments have pressed for more power to gather intelligence.
• Today, it is technically possible to intercept telephone and electronic communications 
that take place anywhere or enter into databases all over the world. 
• The problem is that the control and collection of such information…
– appears to be increasingly incisive (data are collected and evaluated with perspective, 
mapping people)
– and is conducted in a global manner (millions of citizens are under surveillance) without
adequate controls.
– Snowden’s disclosure of US National Security Agency (NSA) information revealed a vast 
surveillance operation existing all around the world. Idem British Intelligence Services 
(GCHQ) and from other States.
– Significant risk that these massive counter-terrorism operations 
could erode fundamental rights protected by the international 
framework, as well as by domestic constitutions, 
• including the right to intimacy, 
• the secrecy of communications, 
• and the right to self-determination regarding our data.
4.2. NECESSIT Y TO F IND AND RESPECT AN APPROPRIATE 
BAL ANCE BET W EEN SECURIT Y AND PRIV ACY
• The development of new technical tools, the existence of Internet services providers ⎯which 
store data for millions of customers⎯, and more powerful software applications, able to 
collect and treat data while extracting relevant quality information, create enhanced law 
enforcement possibilities. 
• All this leaves us open to abuse of our fundamental human right to privacy. 
• In this new scenario, it is necessary to find and respect an appropriate balance between 
security and privacy.

• The chilling effect
4 . 3 . M AS SI VE
W I RETAPE (B UL K
CON TROL)
C A S E  ON M A S S I V E W I RETAPS  ( BUL K C ONTROL )
ECHR, July 1, 2008, the case Liberty and others v. United Kingdom
• It was discovered that the British Defence Services had been intercepting all telecommunications 
between the two British Telecom stations (Clwyd and Chester), a connection that supported most of 
the communications traffic to and from Ireland. 
• This information was stored and filtered through keywords,  etc., before being transferred to 
intelligence analysts. 
• The European Court understood that this involved an interference in the rights of privacy and 
secrecy of communications since such controls are not sufficiently foreseen by law. 
– It extended the guarantees that must accompany these rights when it comes to interception of 
communications to specific individuals to strategic or general interceptions, as was the case, demanding the 
Law fixed the guarantees and limits to the power that should be established in that retrospective 
surveillance.  
– The Court warned that “furthermore, since the application of secret surveillance of communications 
measures is beyond the control of both the interested parties and the public in general, the “Law” would 
conflict with the supremacy of the right in question if the discretional faculty granted to the Administration 
had no limits (para. 94).
THEREFORE,
• Secret, massive and indiscriminate surveillance programmes are not in 
conformity with European human rights law and cannot be justified by the fight
against terrorism or other important threats to national security. 
• Such interferences can only be accepted if they are 
– authorized by law, 
– strictly necessary
– and proportionate to a legitimate aim. 
4. 4 . INTERC EPTING 
C OMMUNIC ATIONS
• ECHR No. 5029/71, September 6, 1978 (Klass and others v.  Germany). 
• When collecting data derived from communications that may affect the secrecy of these 
(wiretapping), the ECHR has established the need of 
– a judicial authorization 
– or authorization by an independent commission
• In Belgium or in France to carry out wiretapping the authorisation of the judge is generally required, in addition, 
in the case of Belgium, to be carried out only in the case of attempted or completed offenses.
BUT EXCEPTIONS
• In Belgium, the Law of July 20, 2015, to strengthen the fight against terrorism has extended the possibility that the 
police perform them, not only to the case of attempted or completed crime, but to a whole set of related 
actions of terrorism (e.g. participation in an organisation with terrorist links, or incitement to terrorism, or the 
threat of terrorism…).
• In the United Kingdom, in the interception of communications in a terrorism investigation, a judge warrant is not 
needed, but of the government: it is the police that carries it out, authorised by the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS).
• France, in terrorism investigations, a warrant of a member of an Administrative Commission of Communications’ 
control (no judge). In case of  “absolute emergency”, no warrant is needed.
– And an Act for the surveillance of international communications was adopted at the end of 2015, which also uses 
vague concepts to justify the possible control and treatment of data obtained in international communications.
– The new law October 2017 
• authorises the Interior Minister, the Defence Minister and the Transport Minister to collect the telephone and email 
communications of suspicious individuals “for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offenses 
and serious crimes”. 
• The law also allows security services to access travel information, including from travel agencies, about airline and maritime 
passengers. 
• Data collection “shall exclude personal data that may reveal a person’s racial or ethnic origin, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, political opinions, trade union membership, or data relating to the health or sexual life of the person concerned”.
• Ex. In Spain, when collecting communications data that may affect secrecy (telephone 
or electronic wiretaps), the 1978 Constitution requires a court order, without distinguishing 
between type of communications or bulk surveillance of communications (Article 18.3). 
• When wiretaps are carried out by intelligence services, as part of their duties, the law 
is more ambiguous.  
– However, the intelligence services are required to observe the provisions of the Organic Act 2/2002, 
providing for prior judicial control of the National Intelligence Centre. In particular, the Secretary of 
State, acting as Director of the National Centre of intelligence, must request the competent Justice 
of the Supreme Court for authorisation to adoption measures affecting home inviolability and 
secrecy of communications.




• The Act on Criminal Procedure was amended by the Organic Act 13/2015 to strengthen 
procedural protections and to regulate technological research measures. It includes overseeing 
electronic communications, PCs, USBs, etc., for the first time.
– As a general rule, cyber-surveillance is only permitted when the government is investigating terrorism 
(or other serious crimes) 
– and the Act almost always requires a judicial warrant as a condition of such surveillance. 
– General principles: 
• Speciality: The surveillance must be related to the investigation of a particular crime.
• Suitability: this requirement means that the government must define the objective and subjective scope and 
duration of the measure.
• Exceptionality and necessity:  The principle of necessity requires that surveillance can be done, and data 
processed, only if the measures taken are adequate, relevant and not excessive. 
• Proportionality: This principle requires a balancing of two interests: security vs. privacy. The intervention must 
be carried out without unduly prejudicing the rights and freedoms of citizens. 
4. 5 . DATA SURVEILLANCE
• Surveillance technology is developing with
breathtaking speed, including a numerous
transactions, through access to private and public-
sector databases.
• Nowadays, technologies exist which allow
– for the use of virtually undetectable listening and 
tracing devices; 
– and for the surreptitious installation of “spyware” 
on someone’s computer capable of secretly
monitoring the online activities and e-mails of the
user, and even turning on the computer’s camera 
and microphone.
– Among other uses
• The storing of enormous amounts of personal data in social security, medical data, travelling, 
and consumer “lifestyle”, built by specialised data mining companies, is a matter of serious
concern. Combining these databases and linking them with other databases creates a 
previously detailed picture of our lives and interests, including financial and medical aspects, 
and cultural, religious and political affiliations. 
• Police and secret services search through such databases in order to find a “match” against a 
pre-determined “profile”. 
4 . 6 . P ERS ONAL  DATA 
EXCHAN GE
The exchange of data among intelligence
servicies has been a fact (always)
UN
• U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178(2014) on Foreign Terrorist Fighters: a general call for 
granting more data surveillance authority to intelligence agencies and require that airlines 
under their jurisdiction provide advance passenger information.
• On the basis of these international provisions and following Jihadist attacks in Paris (2015) and 
Brussels (2016), the EU reached agreements on data transfer that had been long debated.
ECHR
• The exchange of personal data or data on communications is covered by the principle of 
consent
• Exceptions: Art. 8.2. ECHR: 
– There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.
– Prevention of terrorist attacks could be a ground for it.
– But, any way, law must be respected and the data need to be covered by the principes rulling data 
processing.
EU
• Case ECJ Digital Rights Ireland y Seitlinger and others (2014) 
• EU Data Retention Directive compelled all ISPs and telecommunications service providers
operating in Europe to collect and retain a subscriber's incoming and outgoing phone numbers, 
IP addresses, location data, and other key telecom and Internet traffic data for a period of six
months to two years.
• It therefore seeks to ensure that the data are available for the purpose of the prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, such as, in particular, 
organised crime and terrorism. 
• mandated data retention impacts millions of ordinary users by compromising online 
anonymity which is crucial for whistleblowers, investigators, journalists, and those engaging in 
political speech.
• The Court of Justice declares the Data Retention Directive to be invalid (not clear, not
proportional…)
4.7 .  WHEN THE DATA CR OSS THE EXTER NAL BOR DER S. 
THE EXCHANGE OF DATA WITH THIR D COUNTR IES
• Agreement on PNR with USA  and with Australia
• The failed PNR Agreement with Canada and the requirements of the court of justice regarding
the transfer of passenger data (ECJ 26 July 2017)
• ECJ Case Digital Ireland (2014) EU-US Umbrella Agreement 2016, for investigation of crimes, terrorism
• The Safe Harbour Agreement (ECJ Case Schrems, 2015 )              EU-US Privacy Shield 2016
DATA EX CHANGE IN BORDERS
T ERRORIS M AS  A GLOBAL 
PHEN OMEN ON
REGARDIN G BORDERS , T HE AIM 
IS :
• To stop foreign terrorist Fighters
• To avoid the entry of suspected terrorists 
or pursue them for arrest
The utility of data 
exchange
An early warning 
mechanism Cooperation
THE IMPORTANCE OF  DATA EX CHANGE ON THE TRANSF ER OF  
BORDERS IN THE SCHENGEN AREA
• Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA on simplifying the exchange of information and 
intelligence between law enforcement authorities. Schengen Information System (SIS)
• Treaty of Prüm 2005
– DNA profiles, fingerprint data, records of vehicle registration and other personal data
– Visa Information System (VIS) 2014
• Regulation adopting the Schengen borders code 2016, amended in 2017
– Data control of all people when crossing external borders
– Contrast with the data that appear in databases of police interest
– Possibility of selective controls
• Adoption of an Entry-Exit System (EES)
• Drafting a Registered Travelers Program (RTP)
• Negotiating an European travel information and authorisation system (ETIAS)
F RONTEX AS A TOOL IN COUNTER-TERRORISM
• Council Regulation (CE) No. 2007/2004, on the European Agency for the Management of External 
Borders
THE NEW  DIRECTIV ES ON THE PROCESSING OF  DATA V S. THE 
SAF EGUARDING OF  NATIONAL SECURIT Y 
Regulation 2016/679 on data processing
Directive regulating the use of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) data in the EU for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime that was adopted on April 
21, 2016.
Directive (UE) 2017/541, European Parliament and the 
Council on combating terrorism.
THE PERSONAL NAME RECORD REGISTER ( PNR)
• Macro database of passengers passing through European airports
• DIRECTIVE (UE) 2016/681, April 27, 2016, on the use of passenger name record 
(PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime
http://www.aertecsolutions.com/2016/05/02/pnr-el-registro-
internacional-de-pasajeros-aereos/
• 1. Name and surname. They are the 
essential data of the registry, although 
they will be automatically “masked” 
after six months.
• 2. Date of the trip.
• 3. Date of reservation of the ticket.
• 4. Locator.
• 5. Traveller’s information: Phone 
number, email.
• 6. Destination and origin.
• 7. Other previous trips of the traveller.
• 8. Contact address. Data are not 
masked at six months as the identity.
• 9. Means of payment (card or cash).
• 10. Seat on the flight.
• 11. If traveling alone or in a group.
• 12. Information on the ticket: Rate, round 
trip, date of purchase.
• 13. Intermediaries: Travel agency or means 
of ticket acquisition.
• 14. Specify whether the traveller made use 
of his/her ticket or not.
• 15. Luggage.
• 16. Reservation: To know if any 
modification was made in the flight 
reservation.
• 17. Shared code.
• 18. General data.
• 19. Changes in the 18 measures cited.
THE USE ON THE F RONTIERS OF  PROF ILE AND BL ACK LISTS OF  
ALLEGED TERRORISTS
• Consequences of blacklisting or matching a profile:
– Scrutiny of movements, not allowing entry, not asylum due to links with terrorism.
– Reinforcement of registration in frontiers of individuals with certain profiles.
• Risks:
– Stigmatisation of collectives.
– Discriminatory treatment.
– False positives (errors).
SOME PAR TIAL CONCLUSIONS
• The exchange of data on the transit of 
individuals across borders is an extremely 
useful tool.
TERRORISM: 
NEED OF A 
RESPONSE
• Immigration and terrorism




• Principles governing data processing in 
the counter-terrorism policies in borders.




THE ROLE OF  THE COMMUNICATION SERV ICES’  PROV IDERS
• Apple and San Bernardino Case (in California)
• Warrat Case before the US Supreme Court of Justice

5. COUNTER-TERRORISM VS. THOUGHTS, 








S Undue limits to Freedom of the press 
Limits to freedom of 
expression: restraint from 
apology of terrorism
Vest limitations. 
Pretending save security 
against religious symbols
Limits to right to meeting 
and associate in the 
struggle against terrorism.
5. 1 .  A RB I T RA RY  L I M I TAT I ONS  T O FRE E D OM
OF T H E P RE S S
• Freedom of the media is one of the prime achievements in a democracy. 
• The role of the press
• Restricting freedom of expression under cover of anti-terrorism activities is close to handing victory to the 
terrorists. 
• THINGS HAPPEN…
• Fixing microphones and geolocation tags in journalists’ devices or homes, as well as the use of mechanisms 
allowing interception of communications, use of means to break the  confidentiality of journalistic sources and 
the professional secrecy……
• State’s secret cannot be always an excuse to limit access to information. It is absolutely 
crucial to enable journalists to carry out their work and to given to them the opportunity to 
decide whether or not disseminate a piece of information. 
• But ECtHR has decided on the liability of journalists for obtaining and publishing secret 
information in several cases (they violated criminal law that prohibits the dissemination of 
secret information)
• Also prosecution of whistle-blowers
O N L I M I T S T O  J O U R N A L I S T ’ S W O R K
• Committe Ministres CoE 2005 issued a “Declaration on freedom of expression and information in 
the media in the context of the fight against terrorism” called on member states…
– to respect media rights and to not unnecessarily introduce new restriction on freedom of expression
and information and not treat journalis’ reporting of terrorism as supporting of it
– To ensure access to information, scenes of acts and judicial procedings
– To protect their sources and materials
– Not to pressure them
• In 2007 further guidelines on “protecting freedom of expression in times of crisis”, including
terrorist attacks.
• Notwithstanding,
• In Europe, there have been cases of:
– electronic and prospective surveillance of communications by secret services on journalists’ 
working in areas that are the responsibility of the intelligence services. Initially, the ECHR did not
recognize that such surveillance was contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights
because there was sufficient legal coverage for such control and becouse it responded to a 
legitimate interest.
– Limits to journalist in the access to information.
– The laws were used to prosecute journalist for obtaining information from certain sources and 
justified surveillance on the need to identify the sources (breaking down the professional secrecy).
• On dificulties to access to information
• Case Youth Initiative for Human Rights V. Serbia, ECtHRof June 25, 
2013. 
• An NGO, aware that its Government was conducting electronic 
checks on citizens, requested information from the Intelligence Agency 
on how many people had been monitored this way during 2005.  This 
information was denied and they resorted to the Information 
Commission (internal body in charge of ensuring the correct 
application of the Serbian Information Law) that recognised them such 
a right, but then the Intelligence Agency reported that it no longer had 
the information requested. The Court of Strasbourg issued a laudable 
(although possibly unexpected) ruling recognising that the refusal of 
the secret services to provide the required information violated the 
right to receive information and to disseminate it later (Article 10 of 
the Convention), since it was obvious that the interest of the NGO in 
this information resided in the will to disseminate it and contribute to 
the public debate.
• in the case Üper and others v. Turkey, ECtHR October 20, 
2009, (role of the press)
• Turkish authorities had suspended and banned the dissemination 
of certain articles and copies of newspapers as propaganda on 
behalf of a terrorist organisation. However, the Court of 
Strasbourg understood that there had been a violation of the right 
to freedom of expression and press freedom, because the 
draconian measures imposed by the Turkish authorities were of 
such magnitude and lack of justification that they damaged the role 
of the press as a public watchman in a democratic society. In 
addition, the total closure of some publications supposed by the 
authorities the belief that journalists would continue to publish the 
same type of content in the future.
• Association confraternelle de la presse judiciaire
and others v. France
• Case Weber and Saravia v. Germany, ECtHRof June 26, 2006, 
• A German journalist who investigated issues that were subject to the supervision 
of the Federal Intelligence Service, and that travelled to different countries in 
Europe, South America, and Central America, considered that it could deliberately 
be intercepted in their communications in any of these places after the 
introduction by the Government of a system of prospective control (strategic 
monitoring). With this system, following certain keywords, the communications 
and personal data of any citizen were tracked, whether in Germany or abroad, all 
in order to obtain information to prevent terrorist attacks or other risks. For the 
applicant, these controls restricted her journalistic work, because when she 
worked on such matters (terrorism, drugs, arms trafficking...) she could be spied 
on and could no longer be sure that her information and journalistic sources 
could remain confidential, which was crucial for press freedom in a democratic 
state. The Court, after analysing the legal regulation of these strategic controls, 
considered that this was sufficiently guaranteed to ensure the non-abuse of this 
instrument by the authorities and understood that this possible interference in 
communications or the possible danger to press freedom. they were sufficiently 
justified by the safeguarding of a legitimate interest, national security.
• Case Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media and others v. 
Netherlands (ECtHR November 22, 2011) 
• Some journalists had disseminated information about activities of the 
intelligence agency and were subject to surveillance in order to find out 
their sources of information. The Court did not dispute that, in fact, 
behind the surveillance action operated by the intelligence services was 
the interest of safeguarding national security, but it applied the test of “the 
need in a democratic society”. This test requires to determine if the 
“interference” was justified in an “imperious social need”, if it was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons alleged by 
the national authorities to justify it were pertinent and sufficient. The 
Court considered that the legislation in the Netherlands had not passed 
this test and did not provide for sufficient safeguards in relation to the 
surveillance powers used by the State against the plaintiffs in order to 
discover their journalistic sources. And it ended by reiterating once again 
the importance of protecting these sources for the free press in any 
society.
5.2. THE NET AS PL ACE TO EX PRESS IDEAS
• The fight against terrorism could be a risk to the free flow of 
online information. Even a number of ‘old democracies’ have
considered or implemented various restrictions, including new 
ways to block, filter, monitor, and otherwise obstruct or manipulate
the openness of the Internet.
• Certain protective measures are important to ensure that the
Internet remains a safe place and not a tool that can be used to 
perpetrate crimes. 
– To  the Internet must only be subjected to restrictions that are 
strictly necessary
– There should be prior judicial authorization of restrictive measures
as well as judicial review;
– the principle of proportionality must be strictly respected in this
endeavour. 
5.3.  LIMITS TO FR EEDOM OF EXP R ESSION : 
R ESTR AINT FR OM AP OLOGISING FOR JIHADISM
(TER R OR ISM SP EECH )
APOLOGISING FOR JIHADISM, A CRIME
• Internet services are in certain cases abused by third parties to carry out illegal activities online, 
for instance disseminating certain information relating to terrorism or illegal hate speech
• Several UN Decisions and EU Framework Decision 2008/919/JAI, Eu Directive on the struggle
against terrorism
• In compliance with these supranational demands, the Criminal Codes established as crimes
certain manifestations of freedom of thought when they constitute apology or glorification of 




• ECtHR Case Leroy v. France, of October 2, 2008
• This is the case of a cartoonist of the publication Ekaitza, named Denis Leroy. He 
was condemned for advocating terrorism in a drawing on September 11, 2001 that 
symbolised the attack on the Twin Towers with the message “All of us have dreamed 
about it... Hamas has done it”.
• The plaintiff filed an appeal for cassation defending the “right to disseminate, through 
a drawing, an opinion that is not shared by the majority, or an opinion likely to offend 
or shock”.  According to him, it constituted his way of expressing an anti-American 
thought, and satirically transmitting the decline of US imperialism. However, when 
this demand arrived before the ECHR, it did not considered this arguments. For the 
Tribunal, the plaintiff expressed his support and moral solidarity of the alleged 
perpetrators and favourably judged the violence perpetrated against thousands of 
civilians. The Court understood that this threatened the dignity of the victims. The 
Court considered that the drawing published on September 13 had no precaution in 
the language and was not protected within the freedom of expression. 
• EU Internet Forum on progress on removal of terrorist content online, 10 March
2017
• The EU Internet Forum has two key objectives: 
– to reduce accessibility to terrorist content online; 
– and to empower civil society partners to increase the volume of effective alternative narratives
online.
• These two objectives have materialised into: 
– a referral mechanism with the participation of Europol to remove internet content; 
– the creation of a prototype database of hashes developed by the internet industry to create a shared
database to help identify potential terrorist content on social media and prevent its reappearance on
other platforms;
– and the establishment of a Civil Society Empowerment Programme
• Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online (June 2017)
5. 4.  T H E ROL E  OF M E D I A  A C TORS I N C ONFRONT I NG T E RRORIS M
• UNESCO has launched a handbook for journalists related to the
coverage of terrorism, The publication is designed to help them carry
out their work informing the public while avoiding the risk of actually
helping terrorists achieve their aim of dividing societies and turning
people against each other. (March 2017)
• Responsability of the media
• ECtHR Case Belek and Velioglu v. Turkey, (6 October 2015), 
• It referred to the conviction of the plaintiffs by a State Security Court for 
publishing an article in a newspaper containing a statement from an illegal 
armed organisation. The plaintiffs argued that their criminal conviction and 
the prohibition of the newspaper’s publication constituted a violation of 
their right to freedom of expression. The Court held that Article 10 (right 
to freedom of expression) of the Convention had been violated. For the 
Court, paying special attention to the language used in the article in 
question and the context of its publication, and taking into account the 
difficulties of the fight against terrorism, noted that the text, as a whole, 
contained no appeal to the violence, armed resistance or insurrection and 
had not been translated into hate speech, which is the main factor to be 
taken into account.
ON L IN E  C ON T E N T S : 
M E D IA  OR S E R V IC IE S  P R OV ID E R S’  R E S P ON S ABIL IT Y
• June, 2017, Council of Europe held a Colloquium on the role of media actors in confronting
terrorism,  They stated that it "expects industry to … develop new technology and tools to improve
the automatic detection and removal of content that incites to terrorist acts. …"
• The European Parliament, its resolution of 15 June 2017, urged those online platforms "to 
strengthen measures to tackle illegal and harmful content".
• On 28 September 2017, the Commission adopted a Communication with guidance on the
responsibilities of online service providers in respect of illegal content online (COM(2017) 555 
final of 28 September 2017)
• Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council, which is to be 
transposed into national law by 8 September 2018, contains similar provisions in respect of 
online content constituting public provocation to commit a terrorist offence.
• EU COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 1.3.2018 on measures to effectively
tackle illegal content online
• Illegal content online should be tackled with proper and robust safeguards to ensure
protection of the different fundamental rights at stake of all parties concerned. Those
rights include, as the case may be, 
– the freedom of expression,
– including the freedom to receive and impart information, 
– the rights to respect for a person's private life
– and to the protection of personal data 
– as well as the right to effective judicial protection of the users of the services concerned.
• Hosting service providers should expressly set out in their terms of service that they will
not store terrorist content.
THE CLOSURE OF  W EBPAGES THAT PROMOTE JIHADISM
• The success of these terrorist groups is also due to a planned and centralised communication 
strategy based on the use of the Internet and on new technologies. In this context, Twitter has 
risen as a primary protagonist; in 2014, ISIS had more than 40,000 related accounts. 
• This strategy and their ability to adapt to the new tendencies, faster than the 
counterterrorism, allowed them to reach a huge audience, to publicise their actions, frighten 
populations and to attract followers. 
•
• SO,
• A counter-terrorist measure: to close these webpages, withdraw contents,…
– A judicial warrant should be necessary.
• Domestic law at this regard.
5.5.THE CONF LICT BET W EEN RELIGIOUS F REEDOM AND THE 
PRETENDED SECURIT Y
DRESS CODES F OR “SECURIT Y”
• ECtHR
– considered a number of claims alleging that bans on
religious clothing resulted in violations of the
Convention
• Public safety and order
– The European Court has declared inadmissible two applications
concerning French laws that required the temporary removal of 
religious head or face coverings for the purpose of identification and 
security measures. 
In Phull v. France (2005), the applicant
was asked to remove his turban for an
airport security screening.
In the case of El Morsli v. France 
(2008), that applicant was refused entry
to the French consulate when she refused
to remove her veil in front of a man for an
identity check
In Mann Singh v France [2008] ECHR 1523 the
ECtHR unanimously declared inadmissible a claim by Mr
Shingara Mann Singh, a French national, that the
domestic requirement that a photograph intended for
use on a driving licence should show the subject
“bareheaded and facing forward” discriminated against
practising Sikhs. He had argued that refusing to allow
him to wear his turban in the photograph to be used on
his licence violated his rights underArticles 8 (private
and family life), 9 (thought, conscience and religion) and 
14 (discrimination) ECHR.
He decided to try another route – Geneva – on a very
similar issue. In Shingara Mann Singh v 
France [2013] UN Human Rights 
Committee CCPR/C/108/D/1928/2010, published
on 26 September,he complained that when he had
attempted to renew his passport for the fourth time in 
2005 with a photograph showing him wearing his turban. 
He maintained that the turban was an integral part of a 
Sikh’s faith and identity.
The Committee concluded that the formal 
requirements were a disproportionate limitation on Mr
Mann Singh’s freedom of religion, in violation of article
18 of the Covenant.
• In SAS. Vs. France (2014) ECtHR considered legal French 
prohibition to wear the burka and other elements that cover the face 
in the public spaces in accordance with the Convention (justification on 
the ground of public safety).
• INTERFERENCES WITH RELIGIOUS PRACTICIES 
OR ACTS OF WORKSHIP
ECtHR. Case Güler and Uqur v. Turkey, of 2 December
2014, 
It referred to the conviction of the plaintiffs for propaganda 
promoted by a terrorist organization for their participation in a 
religious service. The religiouse service was organized in the
premises of a political party in memory of three members of an
illegal organization (the PKK) that had been killed by the
security forces. The plaintiffs alleged that their conviction had
been based on their participation in a religious service that had
consisted of a simple public demonstration of their religious
practice.
They also maintained that their conviction had not been
sufficiently predictable, given the wording of the appplied Law
against terrorism.
The Court considered a breach of their freedom of religion, 
given the Anti-terrorist law was not enough claire in relation
with that type of activities. 
Interferences with religious practicies or acts of workship
5.6. Limits to right to meeting and associate in the struggle 
against terrorism.
• E.g. In France during the state of emergency:
– Closing of Mosques
– Phohibition of demonstrations
– Not movement permited in certain areas (near Mosques)
– Dissolution of associations or political parties
• French new Law to Strengthen Internal Security and the Fight Against Terrorism oct 2017
– Security Zones. the power to designate public areas and sporting or cultural events, including music 
concerts, that are deemed to be at risk of terrorism, as security zones. to search all persons or vehicles
– Closing Places of Worship.
• Use of religious dress in a ceremony in public spaces
– Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey (2010) (use of religious dress in a ceremony in the streets
of the city, ECtHR considers violation of freedom of religion)
SECURIT Y IN JEOPARDY?

6. RIGHTS OF THE VICTIMS
W HO IS THE V ICTIM OF  A JIHADIST ATTACK?
• The overall number of deadly terrorist attacks in France, the UK, Spain and the US, however, is 
very low by international standards.
– Between 2004-2013, the UK suffered 400 terrorist attacks, mostly in Northern Ireland, and almost all 
of them were non-lethal.  The US suffered 131 attacks, fewer than 20 of which were lethal. France 
suffered 47 attacks. But in Iraq, there were 12,000 attacks and 8,000 of them were lethal.
• Terrorist commit acts that would bring about much media coverage so that their acts would be 
witnessed by a maximum number of people, which in turn would maximise the likelihood that 
their actual target would pay attention to them and comply with their demands.
T YPE OF  V ICTIMS
Direct or Primary Victims:
Those victims that are in the immediate area of the terrorist attack. 
Direct Professional/Volunteer Victims:
People who were at the scene of the terrorist attack as part of their job or as volunteers. 
Indirect or Secondary Victims:
This group includes family members, friends, co-workers etc. of direct victims. 
Community or Tertiary Victims:
This group of victims includes those who may have had their daily routine affected, or have work/school 
access problems. It also includes people who have been affected by images and reports on television. 
Re-victimised victims:
Those people who have been victims of previous terrorist attacks, but are now re-traumatised by a new 
attack or report of a thwarted attack. 
S E RI OUS  D A M AGE S
• Serious injuries can be complex and varied: from death to physical or moral injuries.
• Some people can suffer from prolonged, severe, debilitating and overwhelming symptoms, such 
as depression and an inability to cope with daily life.
• People who are bereaved are likely to be emotionally, psychologically, practically and financially 
affected.
RI G H T S
• Assistance to victims of terrorism and their families is a key part of EU counter-terrorism 
efforts.
• Be informed (access to translation or interpretation services).
• Help and advice by victim support specialists. 
• Have access to confidential victim support services free of charge, before, during and for an 
appropriate time after criminal proceedings. 
• Medical evacuation, payment of immediate medical expenses and costs involved with returning.
• Information, personal privacy and dealing with the media. 
• Assistance and support for victims of terrorism during criminal investigations and prosecutions 
- Protection of victims’ privacy and confidentiality 
- Ensuring an opportunity to speak with the prosecutor 
- Ensuring victims have the opportunity to attend to the court hearings 
- Ensuring victims have a right to address the court at sentencing and parole hearings 
- Giving victims the rights of restitution or other forms of compensation 
- Giving victims the ability to have legal representation during criminal proceedings 
- Right to timely notice of all hearings 
- Conformity with internationally recognised human rights standards and the rule of law 
L AW
• UNODC is working with Member States to strengthen the implementation of national legislation and policies 
that support and protect victims of acts of terrorism.
• UN, 2015, Good Practices in Supporting Victims of Terrorism within the Criminal Justice Framework. 
• Directive 2004/80/EC on compensation for victims of crime in other EU countries. The directive 
has two main elements.
– It requires all EU countries to have a compensation scheme for victims of violent intentional crime committed on 
their territories. The organisation and operation of such schemes is left to the discretion of each EU country.
– It sets up a EU-wide cooperation system based on those national schemes.
• The European Commission has also been providing funding for projects led by public and private organisations.
• Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime.
• European Network of Associations of Victims of Terrorism (NAVT).
• Law 29/2011, September 22, on Recognition and Comprehensive Protection to the Victims of Terrorism.

